by creating a favorable regulatory climate that attracts desirable development from more carefully regulated communities. Local overregulation, by diverting land uses to less environmentally suitable sites, also has adverse regional environmental consequences. In addition, it may operate to exclude or restrict essential land uses, such as lower income housing, to the socioeconomic detriment of the region. This Note demonstrates that the legal doctrines and policy approaches which states have developed to deal with these problems can and should be applied to groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control. And because the federal water pollution control effort cannot succeed without effective control of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution, this Note further argues that federal water pollution control legislation must explicitly encourage and direct state regulation of defects in the local land use decisionmaking process.
I. THE REGULATORY PROBLEM
Groundwater and nonpoint source pollution problems are distinguished by their intimate relation to land use. Groundwater is subsurface water "that occurs in permeable saturated strata of rock, sand, or gravel called aquifers."
4 Aquifers are recharged primarily by the filtration of precipitation or surface water through recharge zones-those portions of the land surface composed of especially permeable soils. 5 Most groundwater contamination originates from the land surface. Nonpoint source pollution-pollution from diffuse sources-threatens both ground and surface water quality. 7 As with groundwater contamination, most nonpoint source pollution emanates from the land surface, usually in the form of runoff or seepage. Waste disposal sites are the source of much groundwater and nonpoint pollution. 8 However, land uses not devoted to waste disposal are a very 12. 33 U.S.C. § § 1311-1345 (1982). Effluent standards are uniform standards applied to the quality of waste discharges into receiving waters. Ambient standards regulate the quality of receiving waters. Pollutant sources are identified and regulated to the extent necessary to maintain the ambient standards.
provides drinking water to over half of the American population,"' feeds and is fed by surface water, 1 8 and once contaminated is virtually impossible to clean. 19 Nonpoint source pollutants (whether or not related to waste disposal) can be as dangerous as point source discharges, 20 and can render successful point source control a nullity. 2 1 Groundwater and nonpoint source pollution now threaten to completely overshadow the problem of point source pollution of surface waters. 2 The regulatory differential can be attributed in significant part to the need to regulate land use in order to control groundwater and nonpoint source pollution. Land use regulation is widely considered a local prerogative. 23 Thus, state legislatures and Congress have been reluctant to include such regulation in their water pollution legislation.
B. The Need for Land Use Regulation
Groundwater and nonpoint source pollution are difficult, and often impossible, to regulate by the traditional methods used to regulate point source discharges into surface water: effluent and ambient standards.
2 4 Ef- [I]t has been estimated that perhaps 80% of the urban areas in the United States will not realize increased water quality from extensive treatment of point sources. . . . Recent evidence indicates that pollution inputs from nonpoint sources in the form of stormwater runoff or drainage due to routine land use practices is responsible for a large part of the degradation of surface water quality. T. WAITE, PRINCIPLES OF WATER QUALITY 255-56 (1984) (emphasis in original).
22. The Conservation Foundation concludes that "[wlhile the quality of surface water may be at least holding its own, groundwater quality may be deteriorating." CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 7, at xxv. In addition, one of "the most important reasons for the lack of progress in controlling many water pollutants [is] that: very little effort has been made to control nonpoint sources .... " Id. See also V. NOVOTNY & G. CHESTERs, supra note 7, at 2 ("Nonpoint sources of pollution account for more than 50% of the total water quality problem . . . ."); Getches, Controlling Groundwater Use and Quality: A Fragmented System, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 623, 631 (1985) (groundwater pollution poses "graver threat" than surface water pollution).
23. 24. Effluent standards may not protect groundwater from point source contamination because it is extremely difficult to determine how a particular discharge will affect water quality. Ambient standards are difficult to maintain because it is often impossible to trace the cause of a violation, especially, as is common with nonpoint pollution, if there are many nearby sources of the pollutant. See L. ORTOLANO, supra note 8, at 116. The hidden nature of groundwater may make significant ambient monitoring impossible. See GROUND-WATER STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 16. fective regulation must include broader controls aimed directly at pollution-causing land uses, 25 particularly when pollution is caused by activities unrelated to waste disposal. 2 Most types of development, whether urban/industrial, 27 suburban/residential, 8 or rural/agricultural, 29 can contribute to groundwater and nonpoint source pollution. Land use regulations which can prevent such pollution fall into two categories. Land use controls, which regulate the location of land uses, may, for example, prohibit certain types 0 what land uses are allowed over an aquifer, local governments have begun to expand their land use controls to include aquifer protection strategies."); Tripp & Jaffe, supra note 5, at 34 (land use controls are necessary to protect groundwater because "the technology for controlling groundwater pollution from waste facilities is simply not adequate to assure non-degradation," and "no technology can control the nonpoint source contamination inevitably resulting from intensive residential, commercial, and industrial development").
26. See V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra note 3, at 261-62 (pollutants from sources unrelated to waste disposal "are so diffuse that they cannot ordinarily be reached by direct regulation, but only indirectly through restrictions on the activities that generate them").
27. 30. In certain circumstances, development must be prohibited altogether. For example, to protect groundwater, development may be banned in the area surrounding a well. See DiNovo & Jaffe, supra note 11, at 10-11. To prevent nonpoint pollution of surface waters, development may be banned on the land immediately surrounding a watercourse. See id. at 12.
Or, land use controls may focus more narrowly on restricting specific sources of harmful pollutants, such as waste landfills, commercial enterprises that store or use hazardous materials, housing developments that utilize septic tanks, commercial development in sensitive areas, or land uses that contribute significantly to erosion. Another regulatory approach that tends to be more closely tailored to the impact of an activity on water quality is the performance standard. Performance standards do not restrict specified land uses, but rather restrict only those land uses that cause a particular adverse effect, such as sediment pollution. 
C. The Inadequacy of Existing Regulation
The EPA has very limited authority to regulate land uses 3 that threaten groundwater quality 4 and/or cause nonpoint pollution. Moreover, CWA has done little to encourage state regulation of such land uses. When enacted, section 208 was considered the "most important aspect of a water pollution control strategy" largely because of its land planning provisions. 3 33. This Note excludes from the term "land use regulation" controls on the operation (as opposed to the siting) of waste disposal facilities. The EPA has authority to regulate waste disposal facility operation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § § 6901-6991i (West 1983 & Supp. 1986 ).
34. The EPA has direct control over land uses which threaten groundwater only under section 1424(e) of the Safe Drinking Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(e) (1982) . This provision enables the EPA to withhold federal grants or contracts from any project that threatens to contaminate an aquifer designated as the sole or principal source of drinking water for a region, if such contamination would create a significant hazard to public health. Although a useful regulatory tool, section 1424(e) has not been effectively employed. Although a few states have developed land use programs for land overlying particularly sensitive and valuable aquifers, 9 no state has implemented a statewide program directed at protecting groundwater. 40 Instead, the states have relied upon local governments to protect groundwater through zoning and public health regulations. 41 Similarly, responsibility for regulating nonpoint source pollution lies largely at the local level.
42
Most local programs are voluntary.' 3 In short, though acknowledging the value of land use regulation in protecting the environment, section 208 leaves states free to determine whether they will utilize such regulation to control groundwater and nonpoint source pollution. The states in turn have largely delegated responsibility for these problems to local governments. Yet relying on local governments to voluntarily use land use regulation to control groundwater and nonpoint source pollution makes little more sense than relying on industrial and municipal point source dischargers to regulate themselves. As with self-regulation by the latter, self-regulation by the former imposes substantial external costs.
II. UNDERREGULATION
Since the 1970's, a number of states have developed legislation providing for some form of state control over land use." Most of this legislation has been prompted by the failure of local governments adequately to regulate the adverse environmental consequences of development. 
A. Environmental Spillovers
A community may tolerate pollution-causing land uses because of a desire to attract development, or a reluctance to regulate politically influential land users.' 7 But another important cause of inadequate land use regulation is simply the financial, technical, or legal inability of many local governments to investigate environmental problems and design effective cures.
8 As a result, local land use controls commonly operate to promote local economic development at the expense of the environment. 4 To the extent that they do take steps to protect the environment through the regulation of land use, local authorities tend to focus on amenity values (e.g., aesthetics, recreation, open spaces, clean-looking lakes or streams, elimination of obvious pollutant sources) rather than on technically oriented public health needs. 50 The effects of regulations which protect local amenities are more readily observable, and thus such regulations may be more politically acceptable. 51 nonpoint source pollution control may suffer-efforts to regulate such pollution often do little to preserve amenity values.
These flaws in the local land use decisionmaking process become a matter of state concern in the event of intermunicipal pollutant spillover from land uses which cause groundwater or nonpoint source pollution. Even if a locality is aware of groundwater or nonpoint source pollution problems, it has little incentive to control them if the costs are borne primarily by residents outside the host community. State supervision of local land use regulation can provide the requisite regional perspective.
B. Economic Spillovers
State review of local land use regulations need not rely on environmental spillovers as its sole justification. Communities with comparatively weak environmental regulations-"pollution havens"-may cause regional economic harm not directly related to any accompanying environmental damage.
Compared to most forms of pollution control, which are generally subject to state and federal supervision, local land use regulations are easily modified and thus particularly susceptible to erosion. 52 The reliance of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control on land use regulation thus makes such control particularly susceptible to the "pollution haven" problem. Intentionally or unintentionally, pollution havens may attract desirable development from communities with stricter environmental programs, thereby imposing costs on those communities. Localities with strict regulatory programs suffer economic harm even without actual migration of development if pollution control costs discourage economic growth 5 3 or create price differentials which have an adverse effect on demand for local products." These adverse economic spillovers caused by pollution havens justify uniform state pollution control standards regardless of the level of intermunicipal environmental spillover. 55 The fact that economic spillovers are caused by defective public rather than private land use decisions water quality management] process may frequently be related to the 'visibility' of the pollution input and its consequences.").
52. See L. ORTOLANO provides an additional justification for state regulation of the local land use decisionmaking process.
C. A Legislative Approach for State Control of Local Underregulation
In recognition of the defects in the local land use decisionmaking process, state land use regulation often focuses on the process rather than on the direct cause of environmental harm-the land user. Under a prominent form of regulation, the state develops guidelines, requires local governments to prepare corresponding plans, and reviews local land use regulations or development permits to ensure that they are consistent with the guidelines.
5 " This approach is in essence conscriptive: Local governments are ordered to shoulder the initial burden of developing and enforcing state land use requirements. After reviewing local efforts for compliance with state guidelines, the state may modify or replace inconsistent local regulations, 57 in certain stream corridors that inter alia causes nonpoint pollution is unlawful; once area land and water use plans are adopted, lawfulness will be judged by reference to area plans); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1103 (Supp. 1985) (municipalities may request delegation of enforcement responsibilities for state sediment control requirements; state will enforce requirements if municipality is unable or unwilling to do so); N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 113A-54, 113A-60 (1983) (state has general regulatory authority over erosion and sedimentation; local governments have option to submit erosion and sediment control program to state for approval). undesirable land use decisions to an adjudicatory board, 59 or penalize local governments with inadequate regulatory programs. 60 Existing state review programs, however, are almost invariably limited to small, environmentally critical portions of the state. 61 A federal program for groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control should focus on promoting state authority to review and influence local regulations instead of requiring direct state regulation of land users. Such an approach is both an effective method of controlling water pollution and a means of according due attention to local and state interests.
Practical Value of State Review of Local Regulations
Environmental harm commonly occurs only as the result of an accumulation of land uses which are in themselves harmless. 6 2 Thus, absent some conception of the course of development within a community, it may be impossible to designate a particular land use as environmentally harmful. 6 3 Developers often cannot be expected to predict the cumulative impact of development, and generally have little control over the course of development in a locality. Ultimate responsibility for prediction and control of the cumulative impacts of development should therefore be placed on government. 64 Where the course of development threatens water qual- ity, the local land use regulations which in large part guide development are a natural object of state regulation.
5
By encouraging or tolerating an environmentally harmful course of development, a local government is in a very real sense a cause of the harm. The wide use of conscriptive state land use programs indicates that many states have acknowledged local government responsibility for harmful land use practices. As a corollary to this responsibility, localities can in certain circumstances be expected to subsidize (with assistance from state and federal government) the cost of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control.
6 Emphasis on local responsibility for pollution-causing land uses also provides a justification for directing enforcement efforts at local governments rather than at land users. 
Local and State Interests
Regulation of the local regulatory effort, rather than of land users, also accords due attention to competing values of purely local impact. When developing a regulatory program pursuant to state guidelines, communities can accommodate a variety of local interests."' Upon review, the state can analyze the impact of local plans on groundwater and nonpoint source pollution and determine whether the local effort unnecessarily compromises regional interests.
In addition, state review of local plans is less burdensome on the state than the two primary alternative methods of state land use control: direct land use regulation of critical areas and direct review of all major developments. The former approach replaces local land use authority; the latter duplicates it. As a practical matter, it is easier to regulate local regulations than it is to regulate the myriad land uses that contribute to pollution. 69. Nevertheless, direct state regulation may be desirable for very sensitive areas or particularly dangerous pollution sources if local governments cannot develop the requisite regulatory resources.
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Enforcement
Enforcement of state land use guidelines designed to control groundwater and nonpoint source pollution can be undertaken by both state and local agencies, and by the courts. No single method of state enforcement can be applied to all states and to all types of pollution problems. 7 0 Ideally, regulatory programs should use the threat of state-developed measures as an enforcement tool. In addition, local governments can justifiably be penalized if they fail adequately to regulate land users. Once pollutioncausing land uses are allowed to proceed, it may be unfair 7 or economically infeasible to terminate them. The only remedies may be prospective: for example, prohibiting, or removing state and federal financial support for, further development desired by the community. 2 Reliance solely on withholding government funding from noncompliant localities is a barely adequate alternative, but may be the only politically acceptable approach for at least some parts of the regulatory program. Enforcement by the courts will be of particular value for programs that rely largely on grant withholding. Even if state guidelines are not formally enacted as law, courts can utilize them to determine whether an environmentally harmful local land use decision is invalid because it harms the regional welfare.7
III. OVERREGULATION
Any land use program must attend to spillovers caused by overregulation in addition to those caused by underregulation. 7 4 Overregulation occurs when excessive local restrictions operate to exclude from a community land uses which, from a regional standpoint, should be allowed to take place in that community. 7 5 Growing environmental concern has 70. For examples of state enforcement approaches, see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. 71. Termination may be unfair if the land user reasonably relied upon a government prediction that the land use would not compromise water quality goals.
72. In contrast, the comparative discreteness, obviousness, and reversibility of point source discharges into surface waters generally make it more practicable and justifiable to penalize individual polluters rather than inadequate regulators of those polluters. brought increased pressure on local governments to exclude purportedly harmful land uses and increased efforts by the states to prevent exclusions that cause harm extending beyond local boundaries.
Because many types of land use have the potential to cause groundwater or nonpoint source pollution," increased attention to such pollution may result in excessive local land use restrictions that harm regional interests, 77 and excessive judicial deference to such restrictions. At a particular site, a variety of regulatory approaches, some more restrictive and some less restrictive of development which is desirable from a regional standpoint, may be adequate to control groundwater 8 and nonpoint 9 pollution problems. Where more restrictive approaches cause adverse spillovers, less restrictive approaches should be encouraged or required. Also, within a particular region, land use in some areas may pose a greater threat to water quality than land use in other areas. 80 It may therefore be in the regional interest to channel certain land uses from less safe areas to more safe areas by removing excessive restrictions on those land uses in the safer areas. 81 As with underregulation, the costs of overregulation are due in large part to defects in local land use decisionmaking processes. Thus, the states preclude otherwise legal and in many cases socially necessary undertakings cannot be allowed to stand on the basis of generalized fears, overbroad assumptions, or unsubstantiated apprehensions about the existence of conditions which might give rise to harm.") (emphasis in original). My focus here is on restrictions which, despite benefitting the general welfare, must be eliminated because they also harm the general (regional) welfare. Judicial deference to land use regulations which, despite benefitting the general welfare, impose burdens on individual landowners has also been the subject of intense criticism. This Note nevertheless will assume that deference to the general welfare is appropriate.
76. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 77. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 589, 557 P.2d 473, 475-76, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43-44 (1976) (noting "growing conflict between the efforts of suburban communities to check disorderly development, with its concomitant problems of air and water pollution and inadequate public facilities, and the increasing public need for adequate housing opportunities"); V. NOVOTNv & G. CHESTERS, supra note 7, at 393, 396 (indicating that use of land use regulation to control nonpoint pollution has potential to be simplistic and overbroad); Miller, supra note 25, at 120 ("aquifer protection and growth are in many cases incompatible").
78. Regulations which focus narrowly on specific sources of pollution, or ambient water quality programs which establish pollutant limitations on a highly technical, case-by-case basis, see V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra note 3, at 261-68, may provide less restrictive alternatives to broadly sketched land use controls.
79. Less restrictive alternatives to the limitation of development that may cause nonpoint pollution include runoff collection or drainage systems. See V. NovOTNY & G. CHEsTERS, supra note 7, at 459-84; DiNovo & Jaffe, supra note 11, at 13. But see Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.) (developer-proposed urban runoff drainage system would not eliminate nonpoint pollution risk; thus, state-imposed density restrictions on commercial development were justified), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981) .
80. For example, land use over clean sections of aquifers will be less desirable than land use over already polluted sections. See Miller, supra note 25, at 123 (Long Island land use regulations designed to protect groundwater permit industrial activity over polluted zone).
81. For example, the New Jersey Pine Barrens management plan, which, inter alia, is designed to protect groundwater, directs growth to often unwilling communities in less sensitive areas within the Pine Barrens. See R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 145, 150 (1985). must regulate these processes. Attention to overregulation is of far greater importance when government is the focus of a regulatory program than when private actors are at issue: Government faces fewer incentives to act efficiently, particularly because it is generally insulated from competitive market pressures.
A. Environmental Spillovers
Local overregulation harms regional environmental interests when it excludes pollution-causing activities from comparatively safe sites and displaces them into less safe areas, or entirely excludes environmentally essential land uses from the region. 82 Such overregulation causes health hazards and regulatory difficulties that would not have occurred had the safer sites been utilized. 8 3 The effect is much like an environmental spillover caused by underregulation.
A community may intentionally overregulate because it is unwilling to deal with environmentally harmful land uses. Or, it may unintentionally overregulate because it does not have the technical or financial ability to tailor regulations to actual physical conditions. 8 The resulting exclusions may be entirely legitimate from a local standpoint. 8 5 It is only when regional environmental interests are taken into account that the restriction constitutes overregulation. Broad exclusionary restrictions must then be re-tailored by the state 8 " to correspond more reasonably to actual physical conditions. (1981) (town may not require sanitary landfill permit seeker to show "absolutely that the project will not discharge toxic substances into the ground water" because that "would virtually preclude any landfills in the state, since contamination of ground water is always a possibility").
83. See R. HEALY & J. RosENBRG, supra note 44, at 183 ("environmental damage is done because the places most suited to the proposed project have rejected it locally").
84. See J. KusLER, supra note 45, at 96 ("Local government units often apply rigid, prohibitory approaches" to sensitive area regulation due to insufficient technical or financial resources.); cf. override overly restrictive local land use regulations in order to site especially dangerous (and therefore locally very undesirable) activities. Many states have imposed substantial limits on local land use controls in order to facilitate the siting of hazardous waste facilities-one of the most dangerous sources of groundwater and nonpoint pollution. 8 The consideration accorded to local land use restrictions on hazardous waste facilities varies from state to state. Many state statutes preempt local restrictions that operate to exclude state-approved facilities. 8 Other states provide for override of local restrictions only upon a special finding by the state. 9 In either case, siting of hazardous waste facilities in violation of local restrictions is unlikely to occur unless it is necessary to meet an important state or regional need. The statutes differ primarily in the level of necessity which must be shown, and the formality with which necessity must be proven. 9 1
Broader use of state invalidation of excessive local restrictions as part of a groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control program lacks one compelling justification of legislation focused narrowly on hazardous waste facility siting: the need to locate extremely dangerous activities at the most suitable sites. Nevertheless, all invalidations of excessive restrictions which cause environmental spillovers share a common justification: rejection of a purely local cost-benefit analysis. 2 Cost-benefit assessments should instead be made from a regional perspective. This does not mean that a project site which leaves the region with a net benefit should auto- CONSERVATION FOUNDATION (state may override local restrictions; justifications must be set forth in writing).
See
91. Energy facility siting has received similar treatment. In Montana, for example, the state energy facility siting board may override any local law or regulation if "as applied to the proposed facility, the law or regulation is unreasonably restrictive in view of the existing technology, of factors of cost or economics, or of the needs of consumers, whether located inside or outside of the directly matically be accepted, whatever the local costs. Rather, it means that siting a land use in a particular locality should be required or encouraged despite a net local detriment if even greater detriments would result from the use of alternative sites within the region. 9 3 Thus, if necessary to prevent diversion of development to less environmentally suitable sites, a community can justifiably be expected to tailor land use regulations to actual physical needs, and to make reasonable efforts to deal with their fair share of the pollution problems which inevitably accompany development.
In addition to hazardous waste facilities, other readily identifiable sources of groundwater or nonpoint pollution, such as nonhazardous waste landfills and industries which use hazardous chemicals, may be the most appropriate objects of a state tailoring requirement. Less discrete sources of groundwater or nonpoint pollution, such as general urban or residential development, may be less suitable for a tailoring requirement unless it can be determined that local restrictions will divert such land uses to less safe sites to a degree that significantly compromises regional welfare. However, at least one state has included within a nonpoint pollution control program an administrative process-similar to the process used by some states in regard to hazardous waste facilities-to review any local disapproval or modification of a developer's nonpoint pollution control plan. 
B. Socioeconomic Spillovers: Exclusionary Zoning
State modification of overly restrictive local land use regulations has not received broad acceptance in existing pollution control programs, aside from hazardous waste facility siting legislation. However, certain states have been vigilant in invalidating excessive environmental land use controls in the context of exclusionary zoning. 9 5 Exclusionary zoning operates, intentionally or unintentionally, to exclude from a community lower income residents or growth in general. 9 The result is an adverse socioeconomic spillover consisting of harm to those who wish to gain admission to the community, and to those communities which host an unfairly large share of the excluded development. By invalidating excessive land use restrictions, the state imposes an obligation on local units of government to bear a fair share of regional housing or development needs."
Because localities often cite environmental problems in order to justify exclusionary zoning, state review of local environmental land use regulations can play a significant role in eliminating exclusionary zoning. The method states have used to eliminate exclusionary environmental land use regulations is quite similar to the method used to control excessive restrictions which cause environmental spillovers: The state requires restrictions to be tailored more closely to actual physical conditions when broader restrictions have undesirable regional effects. 98 In both situations, the traditional deference to local land use restrictions is abandoned in favor of a heightened scrutiny approach: The need to maintain existing local health and safety restrictions is balanced against the regional interest in modifying the restrictions. In several major cases, courts have rejected claims by localities that potential groundwater and/or nonpoint source pollution problems justified exclusionary zoning restrictions. 99. At least one exclusionary zoning case has explicitly held that "closer scrutiny" must be applied to zoning provisions which "in addition to promoting legitimate zoning goals, also halvel effects contrary to the general welfare. 
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Vol. 95: 1433, 1986 tential for conflict between local water quality concerns and regional socioeconomic interests. But any type of cost-producing land use regulation has exclusionary potential. 10 3 Thus the state should scrutinize local land use restrictions designed to control groundwater or nonpoint source pollution in order to identify when environmental concerns are used as a mere pretext for illegitimate exclusionary goals.?° In addition, the state should take steps to reconcile legitimate local environmental concerns with pressing regional needs by applying heightened scrutiny to local land use regulations that have the potential to restrict fulfillment of those needs. 1 0 5
C. The Need for Legislative Intervention
The courts will not adequately control overregulation absent specific legislative direction. Standing requirements preclude many suits based on Tailoring land use regulations more strictly to physical conditions does not sacrifice environmental interests. Indeed, broad land use restrictions may be less effective than narrow restrictions which focus directly on the actual source of the problem. See D. HosKINs, LAND USE, WATER QUALITY AND
ECOSYSTEM INTEGRITY IN THE NEW JERSEY PINELANDS 57-58 (1984) (unpublished Environmental
Defense Fund paper on file with author) (though control of nonpoint pollution of ground and surface waters could be achieved through increased lot sizes, requirement instead of more efficient septic system "may be politically, economically and ecologically more acceptable").
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The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 1433, 1986 regional harms, especially when such suits are brought by nonresidents of the offending community 10 6 Although environmental land use regulation is a technically complex matter, zoning boards commonly are not required to make factual findings to justify their decisions. 1 17 And because zoning is considered a legislative process, courts are generally deferent to zoning restrictions. 0 8 When a challenge is premised on adverse regional consequences, the challenger faces an extraordinary burden of proof.' 0 9 Furthermore, the court may examine only the local impact of a restriction. That is, it may balance community benefit against only the harm done to the plaintiff instead of against the broader, regional harm. 10 Or, the court may feel that accommodation of divergent local and regional interests is a policy matter best left to the legislature. 116. Under Mount Laurel II, for example, the obligation to provide for a fair share of regional housing needs is imposed only upon communities within areas which the State Development Guide Plan designates as "growth." In such areas, once a plaintiff demonstrates that "the land use regulations fail to provide a realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing," the burden shifts to the community to disprove or justify this failure. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Ordinary or relaxed scrutiny should be applied to groundwater and nonpoint pollution regulations where it is unlikely that such regulations will have a significant adverse effect on regional interests. 118. Austin, Texas, has imposed locally a land use program that accommodates many of the interests listed above in a manner similar to that suggested in this Note. Austin lies amongst several watersheds which are sensitive to nonpoint pollution of ground and surface waters. Development in all areas can be expected to contribute to the problem. The Austin watershed ordinances identify comparatively safe areas, and attempt to direct pollution-causing development to these areas. In one watershed, demand for growth is particularly high. Here, the ordinances impose "very specific and detailed stormwater engineering" instead of the broader density and development-prohibition regulations utilized in other watersheds. "These runoff controls substitute, in part, for restrictions that would limit development intensities." See DiNovo & Jaffe, supra note 11, at 12-13.
IV. STATE LAND USE REGULATION: A CONCLUSION
As suggested earlier, the local focus on amenity concerns rather than technical problems is a key cause of underregulation of land use practices which cause groundwater or nonpoint source pollution. 1 1 9 Overregulation results largely from the same focus: Excessively stringent controls, such as overbroad health regulations or attempts to exclude growth or lower income housing, represent a departure from strictly technical concerns. But this does not necessarily mean that a local focus on amenity issues is undesirable. Local governments should retain primary responsibility for protecting local amenity values. 120 Technical requirements, on the other hand, to the extent that they are overlooked by local governments, and to the extent that they are susceptible to standardization, 1 2 ' are particularly appropriate objects of state concern. The state's role can largely be limited to supplementing local land use regulations with more restrictive technical requirements when underregulation has adverse regional effects and replacing local land use regulations with less restrictive technical requirements when overregulation has adverse regional effects. Such an approach may be essential if centralized land use regulation is to be politically acceptable. Technical issues, insofar as they are more "objective" than amenity issues, are an ideal focus for something as controversial as centralized land use regulation.1 22 It is precisely the narrow, technical focus of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control that makes it an appropriate object of federal, as well as state, land use regulation.1
V. THE FEDERAL ROLE
The Clean Water Act declared war on water pollution. This war cannot be won without effective control of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution. Effective control is impossible absent land use regulation. The federal government should therefore acknowledge, encourage, and expand upon recent developments in state land use regulation to mobilize nationwide employment of land use regulation to control groundwater and nonpoint source pollution. Efforts must be made to break down the conservative bias of present land use law."' At least for the purposes of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control, land use regulation must be viewed as simply another tool with which to preserve water quality.
The fundamental federal role should be to promote state review of local regulations. Federal legislation must set forth procedural and substantive standards to guide state programs, and should provide for federal enforcement.
5
Procedural standards should require the creation or employment of state agencies which have the authority to carry out a review program. These agencies must be able to develop land use guidelines for the control of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution, require local governments to prepare regulations corresponding to the guidelines, and take effective enforcement actions against noncompliant localities .
26 Federal standards 124.
[W]hen rational, nonhistorical approches [sic] are made to present day land use problems, they often run head-on into a psychological wall of obdurate incompatible attitudes and behavior patterns. The intense emotional hostility with which many people react to almost any land use control measure cannot generally be explained wholly by reference to economic self-interest. Caldwell, supra note 50, at 188.
125. The federal government presently has no programs that directly require state or local land use regulation. See R. JACKsoN, supra note 123, at 60-61. The National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. § § 4001-4128 (1982), is perhaps the most extensive federal program which significantly penalizes communities which fail to conform their land use regulations to federal guidelines. See id. § 4102 (guidelines for land management and use). The Program directs federal agencies to deny federal financial assistance, and prohibit lending institutions from loaning money, to projects in areas with special flood hazards unless the community in which the area is located participates in the Program. Id. § 4106.
But the federal government is no stranger to using environmental programs to influence the allocation of authority over land use. 127. CZMA requires participating states to provide a method of assuring that "local land and water use regulations within the coastal zone do not unreasonably restrict or exclude land and water uses of regional benefit." 16 U.S.C. § 1455(e)(2) (1982).
128. See supra text accompanying note 56. 129. One version of the SDWA Amendments of 1986 proposed by the House of Representatives took a step in this direction in regard to groundwater. It required states to prepare for each underground source of drinking water plans which describe "the location and types of human development which affect the source and the types of such development which can occur without resulting in the degradation of such sources." S. 124, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 203, § 1443A(a)(3) 131 CONG. RE. S9254 (daily ed. July 10, 1985). The state would then develop groundwater protection measures in accordance with these plans. Id. 1443A(a)(4). This provision was eliminated from the final version of the Amendments.
130. State land use programs, like local programs, may be explicitly directed at promoting industrial and economic growth. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-1-101 (1985) . Though of course such approaches are not inherently objectionable, they indicate that state land use programs may actually contribute to the pollution haven problem on an interstate level.
131. The EPA's lack of authority to develop section 208 plans if state efforts are inadequate is perhaps the biggest obstacle to effective federal enforcement of the land planning aspects of this provision.
132. This issue has been thoroughly treated in Stewart, supra note 53. Stewart's analysis is guided by the now overruled case of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which held that Congressional commerce power violates the Tenth Amendment if it: (1) regulates the "States as States;" (2) addresses matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty;" and (3) impairs the states' ability to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-fore must rely on grant withholding sanctions and direct enforcement actions against violative land uses. It can withhold EPA funding from local units, 133 or order the termination of all federal funding for projects located in sensitive areas, 13 4 in order to encourage local governments to comply with the EPA's state guidelines. In addition, the EPA can proceed against specific pollution-causing land uses which violate state guidelines. For example, the EPA could withhold federal support from violative projects1 3 5 or negotiate agreements with government authorities which have control over potentially violative projects. 136 Or, the EPA can exercise more direct control over land use by developing appropriate ambient standards and tions." Id. at 845, 852. Nevertheless, Stewart concludes that federal conscription of state regulatory powers to control private parties may be constitutional under National League of Cities where federal suits "against individual polluters are too cumbersome and expensive to serve as a realistic alternative," and interstate environmental or economic spillovers are present. Stewart, supra note 53, at 1249-50. Federal intrusion into state sovereignty is justified in these circumstances because the existence of a spillover indicates a strong federal interest, and the fact that individual suits are too cumbersome shows that intrusion into state sovereignty is necessary to vindicate that federal interest. See In the wake of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities), it is presumably up to Congress rather than the courts to determine whether the federal government may order state or local governments to adjust land use regulatory practices in order to control groundwater and nonpoint pollution. See id. at 1018-21 (relying on national political processes to protect states' rights). But cf. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982) (Supreme Court "never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations . . ").
133. 
CONCLUSION
The narrow, relatively objective goal of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control makes it an ideal object of federally mandated state land use regulation. Because the program proposed in this Note relies largely on local preparation of control plans pursuant to state guidelines, local governments are given the opportunity to reconcile the need to control groundwater and nonpoint source pollution with other local land use considerations. On the state level, the proposed review process will emphasize what many states have already realized: Local land use regulation has adverse regional effects which must be policed by the state. Finally, the federal government must mandate such a policing effort in order to fulfill the promise of the Clean Water Act. By requiring state control of local land use regulation, the federal government can ensure that the national water pollution problem is dealt with adequately and fairly.
137.
Cf. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 588-89 (9th Cir. 1985) (action brought by private party in response to violation by silvicultural nonpoint pollution of ambient standards set forth in section 208 plan). Ambient standards are essentially performance standards, an increasingly popular method of land use regulation which allows development to proceed freely as long as it does not cause specified adverse effects. See Delogu, supra note 46, at 301-02.
138. The federal government already has authority in limited circumstances to prescribe land management requirements in order to control nonpoint pollution. See supra note 35.
139. The EPA may in fact need to promulgate some such bans as part of its federal guidelines. See generally South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir. 1974) (under Commerce Clause, "EPA [is] free to promulgate rules that resemble local zoning ordinances").
